SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions

• Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270

  Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal." This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.Questions Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?Holding: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). An "order of removal" includes an "order of deportation," which, in turn, is defined as an order "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." 2. The 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4 as to the holding that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). 9-0 as to the holding that the 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined only as to Part II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part IV.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner:For Respondent:Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809

  Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order." In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024). The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023). Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275

  Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275 Link to Docket: Here. Background:More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Questions Presented:1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider. 2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002

  Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002 This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b). There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence. Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Supreme Court Roundup: Insights from June 18 and 20 Decisions and New Cert Grant

  In today's episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:Last week's 11 opinions and emerging patternsTerm statistics and remaining docket overviewMajor religious liberty case granted certiorari via June 23rd Order ListKey Topics CoveredTerm Statistics (As of June 23, 2025)Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this termCases decided: 52 (approximately 84%)Cases pending: 11 (approximately 16%)Methodology: Consolidated cases counted onceLast Week's Opinion AnalysisUnanimous consensus: 7 of 11 cases showed stable coalition of seven justicesOpinion distribution: Justice Thomas, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Barrett each authored exactly 4 opinionsChief Justice Roberts: Finally joined dissent after 41 consecutive majority opinionsMethodological splits: Justices divided on simple textual approaches vs. complex multi-factor testsFeatured Case Deep Dive: Esteras v. United StatesIssue: Whether judges can consider retribution in supervised release decisionsMajority (Barrett): Applied "expressio unius" canon - Congress deliberately excluded retributionDissent (Alito/Gorsuch): Criticized majority's "mind-bending exercises" for trial judgesVote: 7-2 with additional splintering on implementation detailsStanding Doctrine Analysis: FDA v. Reynolds & Diamond Energy v. EPACommon thread: When can businesses challenge regulations affecting market participants?Identical 7-2 splits with completely different reasoning approachesBarrett's approach: Traditional statutory interpretation and precedent analysisKavanaugh's approach: Practical economic reasoning and regulatory dynamics Certiorari Grant: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Docket Link: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) permits individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials who violate prisoners' religious exercise rights.The Shocking FactsPetitioner: Damon Landor, devout Rastafarian with 20-year religious dreadlocksIncident: Prison officials threw away Fifth Circuit decision protecting his rights, then forcibly shaved his headTimeline: Occurred with just 3 weeks left in his sentenceLegal precedent: Clear violation of Ware v. Louisiana Department of CorrectionsLegal FrameworkRFRA (1993): Applies to federal government; Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) permits individual damagesRLUIPA (2000): Applies to state/local governments receiving federal fundsSister statutes: Nearly identical language and purposesCircuit split: All courts of appeals currently reject RLUIPA individual damagesPetitioner’s (Landor) Key...

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