SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions

• Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

  This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment. Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement." The question presented is: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?Timestamp:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

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• A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

  Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a. That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. The question presented is: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.Timestamp:00:00 Introduction00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin1:16:23 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin1:22:38 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Reply Begins

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• Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25

  Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. 2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

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• Opinion Summary: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929

  The question presented is: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?The Supreme Court held: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

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• CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

  Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

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